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THE ACTION FOR WRONGFUL DEATH IN WASHINGTON
I. INTRODUCTION
1. THE CommoN LAW.
It is elementary that at common law no action would lie for the
death of a human being. Tins view originated with the decision of
Lord Ellenborough in Baker v. Bolton1 and was consistently ad-
hered to in England prior to the adoption of Lord Campbell's
Act.2 A few of the early American cases permitted such an action
to be maintained, 3 but with these few exceptions the American
courts have uniformly followed Baker v. Bolton.4 A discussion of
the reasons for the common law view lies outside the scope' of this
paper.2
2. THE STATUTES.
The first statute giving a right of action for the death of a
human being, Lord Campbell's Act' was adopted in England in
1846. New York adopted a similar statute, a year later. At the
present time all American jurisdictions have statutes conferring a
right of action for wrongful death.7  These statutes differ widely
in their terms, particularly as to the person authorized to bring the
action, and as to those for whose benefit the action is prosecuted.
The statutes, however, fall into two distinct classes. Statutes of the
"1 Campb. 493 (1808).
29 & 10 Vict. c. 93 (1846).
'C ross v. Guthery, 2 Root (Conn.) 90, 1 Am. Dec. 61 (1794) Ford v.
Monroe, 20 Wend. (N. Y.) 210 (1838) Suvlivan v. Unwn Pac. By. Co., 3
DIll. 334, Fed. Cas. No. 13,599 (1874) All of which have since been over-
ruled. Georgia from the beginning, and in the absence of statute, has
permitted a father to maintain an action for loss of services arising from
the death of a minor son. Shields v. Younge, 15 Ga. 349, 60 Am. Dec.
698 (1854). Chic -v. Southwestern R. Co. 57 Ga. 357 (1876)
'The Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199, 7 Sup. Ct. 140, 30 L. Ed. 358 (1886)
and cases cited in notes 22-32 incl. of chapt. 1, TIFFAnY, DEATH By WRONG-
mL ACT (2nd ed., 1913).
r See TIFFANY, ibid., pp. 16-20, for a discussion and criticism of the
reasons generally given in Support of the view that an action for wrong-
ful death should not lie.
*Note 2, supra.
7 These statutes as they existed in November, 1912, are set forth in
an appendix to TiFFANY. ibid.
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first and by far the larger group, following Lord Campbell's Act,
create a new and independent cause of action for the death of the
deceased in favor of the specified beneficiaries. These are the true
death statutes. The second group comprehends the so-called "sur
vival statutes," that is statutes which merely keep alive the right of
action which the deceased himself would have had, had he lived. A
number of jurisdictions, including Washington, have adopted
statutes of both types.
The Washington statutes as they existed prior to 1927, and as
amended by the legislative session of that year are set forth below
Rem. Comp. Stat. 183. Right of Acton for Wrongful
Death.
When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful
act, neglect or default of another his personal represen-
tative may maintain an action for damages against the per-
son causing the death, and although the death may have
been caused under such circumstances as amount in law to
a felony
Rem. Comp. Stat. 183-1. Beneficiaries of Acton for
Wrongful Death.
Every such action shall be for the benefit of the wife,
husband, child or children of the person whose death shall
have been so caused. If there be no wife or husband or
child or children, such action may be maintained for the
benefit of the parents, sisters or minor brothers who may
be dependent upon the deceased person for support, and
who are resident within the United States at the time of
his death. In every such action the jury may give such
damages as, under all the circumstances of the case, may
to them seem just.
Rem. Comp. Stat. 183-2. Application of Terms.
Words in this act denoting the singular shall be under-
stood as belonging to a plurality of persons or things. The
masculine shall apply also to the feminine, and the word
person shall also apply to bodies politic and corporate.,
Rem. Comp. Stat. 184. Action for Injury or Death of Child
or Ward.
A father, or in case of the death or desertion of his fam-
ily, the mother may maintain an action as plaintiff for the
injury or death of a child, and a guardian for the injury
or death of his wardY
8 P C. sees. 8259-8261. Adopted in its present form in 1917.
9 P C. see. 8264. Adopted 1869.
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The foregoing section was amended in 1927 to read as
follows.
L. '27, p. 241, see. 1. (Rem. 1927 Sup. sec. 184.)
A father, or in case of his death or desertion of his fam-
ily, the mother may maintain an action as plaintiff for
the injury or death of a minor child, or a child on whom
either is dependent for support, and the mother for the
injury or death of an illegitimate minor child, or an illegi-
timate child on whom she is dependent for support.
Rem. Comp. Stat. 194. Act-on for Personal In3ury Sur-
vives to Wife, Child or Heirs.
No action for a personal injury to any person occasion-
ing his death shall abate, nor shall such right of action
determine, by reason of such death, if he have a wife or
child living, or leaving no wife or issue, if he have depen-
dent upon him for support and resident within the United
States at the time of his death, parents, sisters or minor
brothers; but such action may be prosecuted, or commenced
and prosecuted, in favor of such wife or in favor of the
wife and children, or if no wife, in favor of such child or
children, or if no wife or child or children, then in favor
of his parents, sisters or minor brothers who may be de-
pendent upon him for support, and resident in the United
States at the time of his death.10
The foregoing section was amended in 1927, to read as
follows:
L. '27, p. 143, sec 1. (Rem. 1927 Sup. sec. 194)
No action for a personal injury to any person occasion-
mg his death shall abate, nor shall such right of action de-
termine, by reason of such death, if he have a wife or child
living, or leaving no wife or issue, if he have dependent
upon him for support and resident within the United
States at the time of his death, parents, sisters, or minor
brothers, but such action may be prosecuted or commenced
and prosecuted, by the executor or administrator of the de-
ceased, in favor of such wife, or in favor of the wife or
children, or if no wife, in favor of such child or children,
or if no wife or child or children, then in favor of his
parents, sisters or minor brothers who may be dependent
upon him for support, and resident within the United
States at the time of his death.11
There is considerable conflict in other jurisdictions as to the
proper rule of construction to be adopted in applying these statutes.
'OP. C. sec. 8275. Adopted in this form in 1909.
11 It will be noted that the insertion of the italicized words consti-
tute the only change made by this amendment.
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One line of authority has taken the position that since this legisla-
tion is remedial in character, a liberal rule of construction should
be adopted,12 while other courts apply the familiar principle that
statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly con-
strued.12 In construing the Washington statutes, the Supreme
Court of this state has taken the position that since sections 183
and 184 of Rem. Comp. Stat. 14 create a cause of action unknown to
the common law, they are to be strictly construed in determining
the persons entitled to sue, but liberally in applying the statute
in their favor."5 On the other hand in construing section 194, a
liberal construction as to all questions is adopted on the theory that
that statute does not create a new cause of action but only keeps
alive the deceased's common law right of action for personal in-
juries. 6
II. ACTION UNDER THE WASHINGTON DEATH STATUTES
(Rem. Comp. Stat. sections 183 and 184)
It will be noted that sections 183 and 184 as above set forth are
true death statutes in that they create a new and independent cause
of action in favor of the named beneficiaries. On the other hand
section 194 is a survival statute.
1. A cTION FOR THE BENEFIT OF WIFE OP. CHILD FOR DEATH OF Hus-
BAND OR FATHER.
The action in favor of a wife or child for the death of the hus-
band or father is given by that language of section 183-1, which
provides that "every such action shall be for the benefit of the wife,
husband, child or children of the person whose death shall have
been so caused."
As originally enacted, this section read simply, "his heirs or per
Merkle v. Benrnngton Tp., 58 Mich. 156, 24 N. W 776, 55 Am. Rep. 666
(1885).
13Jackson v. Ry. Co., 87 Mo. 422, 56 Am. Rep. 460 (1885).
"For purposes of brevity sections 183, 184, and 194 of Rein. Comp.
Stat. will hereinafter be referred to simply as sections 183, 184 and 194,
respectively.
15 Whittlesey v. Seattle, 94 Wash. 645, 163 Pac. 193, L. R. A. 1917D,
1084 (1917) But cf. Brunner v. Little, 97 Wash. 319, 166 Pac. 1166 (1917)
where a liberal construction was adopted as to the parties entitled to sue
under a statute (Rem. Comp. Stat. sees. 6382 et seq.) giving a right of
action against the surety for the wrongful death of a person killed by or
in jitney busses.
"1 Whittlesey v. Seattle, note 15, supra, Thompson v. Seattle, Renton
& S. R. Co., 71 Wash. 436, 128 Pac. 1070 (1912).
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sonal representative may maintain an action.' 17 Under the statute
as it then read the action could be brought either by the wife and
children, or by the administrator. If brought by the wife and
children, they had to join in one action, separate actions not being
permitted."' If on the other hand the action was brought by the
adminstrator it was necessary to show that the wife and children
knew of the action, and consented to its being brought by the admn-
istrator. 9 The widow, however, could consent for the minor chil-
dren under the age of 14 years.20 In the event that the action was
brought by the administrator, the recovery if any did not form
part of the assets of the estate but enured immediately to the wife
and children by operation of law.
2
'
Under our present statute, however, the action is vested solely
in the administrator, and while the action is for the benefit of the
wife and children, they cannot personally maintain the action.22
Although no decisions on the question have arisen since the enact-
ment of the present statute in 1917, it would seem that the recovery
still enures to the wife and children by operation of law and does
not belong to the estate of the deceased.23
In case of the death of the husband and father the present statute
clearly provides that the action is to be maintained primarily for
the benefit of the wife and children of the deceased. There is no
requirement that the wife or children be dependent upon the de-
ceased for support.24 Nor is it required that they be residents or
citizens of the United States.2 r5 The fact that the deceased may have
abandoned Ins wife and children and was contributing nothing to
their support prior to his death does not bar an action for his death
by the admimstrator for their benefit,28 as his legal liability to fur-
2 "Bal. Code sec. 4828.
Riggs v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co, 60 Wash. 292, 1M1 Pac. 162 (1910).
"Copeland v. Seattle, 33 Wash. 415, 74 Pac. 582, 65 L. R. A. 333
(1903), Koloff v. Chicago, M. & S. P R1y. Co., 71 Wash. 543, 129 Pac. 398
(1913).
" Koloff v. Chicago, M. & St. P R. Co., note 19, supra.
'Archibald v. Lincoln County, 50 Wash. 55, 96 Pac. 831 (1908)
"Rententc v. Gibson Packing Co., 132 Wash. 108, 231 Pac. 773, 37
A. L. R. 830 (1924).
"Archibald v. Lincoln County, note 21, supra.
tjTensen v. Culbert, 134 Wash. 599, 236 Pac. 101 (1925).
IAnustasakas v. International Contract Co., 51 Wash. 119, 98 Pac. 93,
21 L. R. A. (n. s.) 67, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1089 '(1908). An early federal case
construing the Washington statute reached a contrary conclusion. Roberts
v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 161 Fed. 239 (D. C. Wash., 1904). The later
federal cases have, however, adopted the view of the Washington Court.
Salvelztch v. Lytle Logging & Mercantile Co., 173 Fed. 277 (C. C. A. 9th,
1909).
'Fogarty v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 85.Wash. 90, 147 Pac. 652, L. R. A.
1916C, 803 (1915), (action under Federal Employer's Liability Act.)
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nish such support still continued, and presumably has some pecun-
iary value. The fact of such abandonment may be shown, how-
ever, in mitigation of damages"'
The statute provides that, "in every such action the jury may
give such damages as, under all the circumstances of the case, may
to them seem just." The court, in a long line of cases, has held this
provision to mean only the actual pecuniary loss to the wife and
children arising from the death.28 Pecuniary loss, however, in addi-
tion to the deprivation of support, includes the loss of the society,
comfort and protection of the husband, and such loss is a proper
item of damage. 29 Similarly an allowance may be made for the loss
to the children of the society and comfort of their father, and of
that mental, moral, physical training that he alone could give,30 such
a loss being a pecuniary one. Nor is a child limited to such pecun-
iary loss as he will sustain during his minority When the evidence
is such as to indicate that the child will continue to suffer a
pecuniary loss after attaining his majority, it is proper to instruct
that damages may be allowed for such prospective loss.31
A difficult and, unfortunately, as yet unsettled question arises
as to the mode of distribution of the recovery as between the bene-
ficiaries. The statutes of many states expressly provide some mode
for apportioning the recovery, but ours is silent on this point. The
Supreme Court has in one case suggested by way of dictum that "it
could be argued with plausibility" that the surviving widow and
children are to share equally in the recovery 32 It is difficult to see
how a "plausible argument" could be made for such a view, in the
light of our repeated holdings that the measure of the defendant's
"Fogarty v. Northern Pacific By. Co., note 26, supra, Creamer v.
Moran Bros. Co., 41 Wash. 636, 84 Pac. 592 (1906).
21 Klepsch v. McDonald, 4 Wash. 436, 30 Pac. 991, 31 Am. St. Rep. 936
(1892) Walker v. McNeil, 17 Wash. 582, 50 Pac. 518 (1897) Halverson v.
Seattle Electric Co., 35,Wash. 600, 77 Pac. 1058 (1904) Rochester v.
Seattle, Renton & 5. R. Co., 75 Wash. 559, 135 Pac. 209 (1913) Castner v.
Tacoma Gas & Fuel Co., 123 Wash. 236, 212 Pac. 283 (1923) Felt v. Puget
Sou2d Electric Ry., 175 Fed. 477 (D. G. Wash., 1909).
- Walker v. McNeil, note 28, supra, Halverson v. Seattle Electric Co.,
note 28, supra, Felt v. Puget Sound Electric Ry. Co., note 28, supra.
Northern Pac. By. Co. v. Freeman, 83 Fed. 82 (C. C. A. 9th, 1897) reversed
on other grounds, 174 U. S. 379 (1899).
"Walker v. McNeil, note 28, supra, Northern Pae. Ry. Co. v. Freeman,
note 29, supra.
" Rochester v. Seattle, Renton & 5. R. Co., 67 Wash. 545, 122 Pac. 23,
39 L. R. A. (n. s.)1156 (1912) (child mentally defective; deceased had
been in good health and was a provident father.)
Schultz v. Western Farm Tractor Co., 111 Wash. 351, 190 Pac. 1007,
14 A. L. R. 514 (1920).
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liability is the pecuniary loss to the beneficiaries. When there is
more than one beneficiary then the sum total of the pecuniary
losses incurred by them is the measure of the defendant's liability I"
To hold that the pecuniary losses incurred by the various bene-
ficiaries should fix the defendant's liability, but as between them-
selves they should all share equally regardless of their loss, would
hardly seen justifiable. Certainly it would not tend to accomplish
the primary end of awarding damages in any case, namely, that of
compensation. The Supreme Court has twice refused to pass on
the question on the ground that it was not properly presented.3 4
In the first of these cases error was predicated on the fact that the
jury was instructed to, and returned a verdict segregating the dam-
ages of the various beneficiaries. In the second, error was predi-
cated on the failure to so segregate the damages. In both cases the
court refused to decide the question raised on the ground that the
defendant had failed to assign as error the excessiveness of the ver-
dict. In the former case, however, the court indicated that they did
not approve the practice of having the jury apportion the dam-
ages, and they repeated this language in the later case. It would
seem that whatever machinery for apportionment the court ulti-
mately adopts, the basis of such apportionment should be the pecun-
iary loss incurred by the various beneficiaries.
2. ACTION FOR THE BENEFIT OF HUSBAND OR CHIWD FOR DEATH OF
WIPE OR MOTHER.
Prior to 1917 a husband under what is now section 183, could
not maintain an action for the wrongful death of his wife."5 Al-
though it seems to have been assumed in an early case36 that a child
could maintain an action for the death of its mother, the court
when the question was first brought to their attention, held that
under the then existing statue, no such action could be maintained.37
The court in conclusion recommended that the legislature reword
the statute so as to permit an action for the benefit of the husband
and children for the death of the wife and mother.
13 See cases cited in notes 28, 29 and 30, supra.
1 Stephenson v. Parton, 89 Wash. 653, 155 Pac. 147 (1916) Heath v.
Stephens, 144 Wash. 440, 258 Pac. 321 (1927).
3Johnson v. Seattle Electrw Co., 39 Wash. 211, 81 Pac. 705 (1905)
Hamlin v. Columbia & Puget S. Ry. Co., 37 Wash. 448, 79 Pac. 99
(1905).
31 Whittlesey v. Seattle, note 15, supra.
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This decision was followed by the present statute which permits
an action to be maintained by the administrator for the benefit of
the surviving husband and children of the deceased. The general
rules as to recovery and as to the amount thereof are the same as
in the case of an action for the death of the husband. Thus the
measure of damages is the pecuniary loss to the beneficiaries. 8
But as in the case of the death of the husband, pecuniary loss in-
eludes the loss to the children of the mental, moral and physical
training that only their mother could give them.3  There is an inti-
mation in the case of Castner v. Tacoma Gas & Fuel Co.,40 that
where the action is brought for the benefit of adult children, it is
necessary to plead and prove dependency of such children on their
mother in order to permit a recovery Such a rule is obviously
incorrect in the light of the language of our statute, and it is prob-
able that all the court intended to mean by the language used
was that the child in that case had failed to show a pecuniary loss.
In any event the doctrine that dependency is required was shortly
afterwards repudiated, the court pointing out that the only con-
dition to a recovery was a showing of pecuniary loss."
An interesting question arises as to whether the husband may
recover funeral expenses incident to the wife's death. The ques-
tion first arose in this state at a time when no action could be
maintained by the husband for the death itself. The court never-
theless held as a matter of common law, and in the absence of
statute that such a recovery might be had.42 While the authorities
on this question as a matter of common law are somewhat meager,
the weight of authority is in accord with the Washington view.4
Somewhat singularly, the court in Castner v. Tacoma Gas & Fuel
Co.,"4 without discussion, held that funeral expenses could not be
recovered by the husband although the statutes had then been
amended so as to permit an action for the death itself. The court,
however, immediately reversed itself on this point on re-hearing,45
permitting the husband to recover the expenses incident to his
wife's funeral.
's Castner v. Taconi Gas & Fuel Co., 128 Wash. 236, 212 Pac. 283
(1923) Jensen v. Culbert, 134 Wash. 599, 236 Pae. 101 (1925) Wood-
bury v. Hoquiam Water Co., 138 Wash. 254, 244 Pac. 565 (1926).
"Aronson v. Everett, 136 Wash. 312, 239 Pac. 1011 (1925).
4o Note 38, supra.
"Jensen v. Culbert, note 38, supra.
"-PhiblJ v. Northern Pac. By. Co., 46 Wash. 173, 89 Pac. 468, 9 L. R. A.
(n. s.) 1193, 123 Am. St. Rep. 926, 13 Ann. Cas. 742 (1907).
43 See annotation on this question 9 L. R. A. (n. s.) 1193.
"Note 38, supra.
C astner v. Tacoma Gas & Fuel Co., 126 Wash. 657, 219 Pac. 12 (1923).
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3. AcTioN BY OR FOp BENEFIT OF P AENT FoB DEATH OF CHILD.
From an examination of the statutes it is apparent that they give
a parent two separate rights of action for the death- of-a child, one
under section 183, and one under section 184. When section 184
is mentioned, it is used to refer to that section of Remington Com-
piled Statutes as it stood prior to its amendment in 1927 That
amendment will be discussed separately
(a) Action by Administrator for Benefit of Parent for the Wrong-
ful Death of a Child. (Rem. Comp Stat. sections 183, 183-1.)
Prior to 1909, when the section which is now section 183 read that
"his heirs" could maintain an action for the death of a deceased
person, the court consistently held that no action could be main-
tamed by a parent thereunder for the death of a child46 on the
theory that a parent was not an "heir" within the meaning of
the statute.
Under-the present statute (see. 183-1) it is clear from a mere
reading of the statute that no action for the benefit of the parents
may be maintained if there is a husband, wife or child of the
deceased living. Further the action cannot be brought personally
by the parents, but must be brought by the admmistrator. 7 In
addition the parent must have been dependent on the deceased at
the time of his death.48 Where the action is brought under section
183, it is not necessary that the child be a minor if the parent is
dependent on him for support. 9 The court has consistently held
that a substantial degree of dependency is required, aris-
Ing from necessitous want, and a recognition of that necessity on
"Noble v. Seattle, 19 Wash. 133, 52 Pac. 1013, 40 L. R. A. 822 (1898)
Nesbit v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 22 Wash. 698, 61 Pac. 141 (1900) Man-
nzng v. Tacoma R. & Power Co., 34 Wash. 406, 75 Pac. 994 (1904) Deuber
v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 100 Fed. 424 (D. C. Wash., 1900).
" Broughton v. Ore.-Wash. R. and Nav. Co., 137 Wash. 135, 241 Pac.
963 (1925).
"Kanton v. Kelley, 65 Wash 614, 118 Pac. 890 (1911) Mesher v.
Osborne, 75 Wash. 439, 134 Pac. 1092, 48 L. R. A. (u. a.) 917 (1913)
Machec v. Seattle, 118 Wash. 42, 203 Pac. 25 (1921) Grant v. Libby,
McACeill & Libby, 145 Wash. 31, 258 Pac. 842 (1927). And see comment on
the latter case, 3 WAsH. LAw REV. 54.
"Machek v. Seattle, note 48, supra.
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the part of the child.50 Thus mere occasional contributions by the
deceased to his parents in the nature of gifts, who support them-
selves is not sufficient." Nor is the fact that the deceased gave all
his earnings to his parents sufficient where they are able to sup-
port themselves.5 2 The fact that the deceased may have promised
to support his parents in the event that they should become depen-
dent in their old age will not support an action for his death under
this section " as actual dependency at the time of his death is re-
quired. The dependency apparently, however, may be partial and
still support the action, the court having stated by way of dictum in
a recent case that where a person was dependent on several sources
of support and one of those sources was removed by the wrongful
act of another, that recovery might be had against the wrongdoer
to the extent which the deceased contributed to his support.5 4 The
sole measure of recovery is the monetary value of the support of
which the parent has been deprived.5 5 It should be noted that there
is the further requirement that the parents be residents of the
United States at the time of the death in order to be entitled to the
benefits of this section.
This section permits the administrator also to maintain the action
for the benefit of the sisters and minor brothers of the deceased who
may be dependent upon him for support. But one case has as yet
arisen under this provision. The same rules govern a recovery on
their behalf as govern a recovery on behalf of the parents. 55a
(b) Action by Parent for the Wrongful Death of a Child Under
Section 184.
This statute (section 184) differs from both section 183 and
194 in that it provides that the beneficiary may personally main-
tain the action. The action is primarily vested in the father, but
in case of his death or desertion it may be maintained by the
5Bortle v. North. Pac. Ry. Go., 60 Wash. 552, 111 Pac. 780, Ann.
Cas. 1812B, 731 (1910), (action under dependency provision of section 194,
but rule would be same under section 183). Kanton. v. Kelley, note 48,
supra, Grant v. Libby, McNeill & Libby, note 48, supra, 3 WASH. L&w
Rv. 54.
" Bortle v. North. Pac. Ry. Co., note 40, supra.
52Kanton v. Kelley, note 48, supra.
"Kanton. v. Kelley, note 48, supra.
" Grant v. Libby, McNeill 4 Libby, note 48, supra. See also Estes 0.
Schulte, 146 Wash. 688, 264 Pac. 990 (1928).5' Machek v. Seattle, note 48, supra.55a Estes v. Schulte, note 54, supra.
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mother. The court has given liberal interpretation to the provi-
sion permitting the mother to maintain the action in case of the
death or desertion of the husband. Thus where the parents had
been divorced and the custody of the deceased was awarded to the
father but he had later returned him to the mother and then
abandoned him, contributing nothing to Ins support, it was held
that the mother was entitled to sue.56 Where, however, the mother
has re-married, the step-father would be a necessary party plaintiff,
since the recovery wnch is based on loss of services, will under our
system be community property 7  In case of the death of an ille-
gitimate child the action under this section is vested primarily in
the mother.58
This section of the statute merely provides that the parents may
maintain an action for the "injury or death" of a child and is
silent as to what the basis of the action is or what the measure of
damages shall be. The effect of the statute as construed by our
court, is not nearly so broad as the language used would seem to
indicate. In an early case"9 the court held that the basis of the
action granted by this statute was the loss of the services of a ninor
child to wnch the father is legally entitled. It will be noticed that
the language of the statute is "injury or death." Since a parent
at common law had a right of action for the loss of services of his
minor child arising from an injury, the court construed that por-
tion of this statute giving a right of action to the parent for "in-
jury" to the child as merely declaratory of the common law right
of action for loss of services, and then construed the statute as
extending the common law rule so as to permit a recovery for loss
of services arising from death. It is now too late to question the
merits of this construction of the statute, as it has been consistently
adhered to'0 and, indeed, has practically been embodied m the
statute by the 1927 ameildment thereto.8 1 Since the action is one
based on loss of services it may only be maintained for the death of
Clark v. Northern Pac. Ry. (o., 29 Wash. 139, 69 Pac. 636 (1902).
"£Magnuson v. O'Dea, 75 Wash. 574, 134 Pac. 640, Ann. Cas. 1915D,
1230 (1913).
Goldmeyer v. VanBibber, 130 Wash. 8, 225 Pac. 821 (1924), L. 1927
p. 241, sec. 1.
19 Hedruck v. Ilwaco R. & Noav. Co., 4 Wash. 400, 30 Pac. 714 (1892).
"°Atrops v. Costello, 8 Wash. 149, 35 Pac. 620 (1894) Dean V. Ore. 1?.
& N va. Co., 44 Wash. 564, 87 Pac. 824 (1906) Mesher v. Osborne, 75 Wash.
439, 134 Pac. 1092, 8 L. R. A. (n. s.) 917 (1913) Machek v. Seattle, note
48, supra, Penoza v. Southern Pac. By. Co., 215 Fed. 200 (D. C. Wash.,
1914).
' See discussion of this amendment, =nfra, herein.
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a minor child.6" Dependency of the parent, however, is not neces-
sary 63 Once the child's minority is established, all that will defeat
the action is proof of contributory negligence or of emancipation. 4
The measure of damages in an action by the parent under this
section is the monetary value of the lost services and in addition
such medicil and funeral expenses incurred by the parent by
reason of the injury and death."5 While the plaintiff may, if he sees
fit, offer evidence of the child's earning power66 such evidence is
not essential to a recovery, but since the value of such services are
incapable of exact ascertainment, such value is to be determined by
the jury, taking into consideration the child's age, health, habits,
character and the station in life of the parents.6 ' The court has
repeatedly announced that the damages to be so ascertained are
substantial in amount.6 8 Substantial damages may be recovered
even where the parents are in comfortable circumstances and it
had been their intention to continue the child's education until it
attained its majority 68 The defendant may, however, show the cost
of maintaining and educating the child in mitigation of dam-
ages.69a
It is important to note that a father of a minor child on whom
he is dependent for support may recover both under section 183
and section 184. The court has held that an action under one sec-
tion does not bar an action under the other "0 since the basis of the
Mesher v. Osborne, note 60, supra, Afachek v. Seattle, note 48, supra,
Broughton v. Ore.-Wash. R. & N. Go., note 47, supra. In the latter case
recovery was denied the parents for the funeral expenses of an adult son.
Compare Philby v. Northern Pao. Ry. Go., note 42, supra.
SMesher v. Osborne, note 60, supra, Machek v. Seattle, note 48,
supra.
64Kanton v. Kelley, note 48, supra. Had cases such as Kanton v.
Kelley and Grant v. Libby, McNeill & Libby, note 48, supra, been brought
under section 184 instead of section 183, a recovery could have been had.
See 3 WASH. LAw REv. 54.
"Hedrick v. liwaco R. & N. Co., note 59, supra, Dean v. Ore. R. &
N. Co., note 60, supra, Sktfmire v. Seattle, 138 Wash. 340, 244 Pac. 545
(1926).
"Kranzusch v. Trustee Co., 93 Wash. 629, 161 Pac. 492 (1916).
,7 Atrops v. Costello, note 60, supra, Kranzusch v. Trustee Go., note 66,
supra, Sweeten v. Pacific Power and Lzght Co., 88 Wash. 679, 153 Pac.
1054 (1915).
See cases cited in note 67, supra. See also, St. Germazn v. Potlach
Lbr Co., 76 Wash. 102, 135 Pac. 804 (1913) Sksdmore v. Seattle, note 65,
supra.
61 Atkeson v. Jackson Estate, 72 Wash. 233, 130 Pac. 102, 44 L. R. A.
(n. s.) 349 (1913)
6a Teker v. Seattle, Renton & S. R. Co., 60 Wash. 570, 111 Pac. 791,
Ann. Cas. 1912B, 842 (1910) Atrops v. Costello, note 60, supra.
"'Hedrtck v. Ilwaco R. & N. Co., note 49, supra, Machek v. Seattle,
note 48, supra.
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two actions and the measure of recovery is entirely different.
There remains to be considered the effect of the 1927 amend-
ment71 on section 184. It will be noted that the former statute has
been kept intact as the first part of the new statute with the ex-
ception that the word "minor" has been inserted in front of the
word child. This change does not affect the existing law as our
court, as pointed out above, has consistently held that the action
under section 184 may only be maintained for the death of a minor
child. In addition thereto the legislature has added an entirely
new clause the effect of which is that the father may maintain an
action for the wrongful death of a child on whom either he or the
mother is dependent for support. It would seem that this addition
gives exactly the same right of action as that given by section 183,
and that the measure of damages, namely, the loss of support,
would be the same in both instances. However, the action under
section 183 may only be brought by the administrator while the
amendment provides that it may be brought by the parent directly
Under the present amendment, therefore, a dependent father may
sue the wrongdoer directly for the death of his child for the result-
ant loss of support. A difficult question arises as to whether the
new section impliedly repeals that part of section 183 winch pro-
vides that the administrator of the deceased's estate shall bring an
action for the benefit of the dependent parent. Since our court
does not favor implied repeals in tins class of cases7 2 it would seem
that the action may now be brought either by the adminstrator or
by the father. Where, however, it is brought by the administrator,
it would seem by analogy to the cases winch arose at the time when
either the wife, or the administrator could sue for the death of the
husband, that the consent of the parent to the adminstrator's
bringing the suit would have to be sworn.7 1
III. AcTioN UNim = SuRvivoRsmr STATUTE
(Rem. Comp. Stat. See. 194)
As has already been pointed out, the so-called death statutes are
of two kinds, namely those winch give a new and independent cause
of action arising out of the death, and those winch merely continue
or keep alive the cause of action winch the deceased would have had,
nL. '27, p. 241, Sec. 1.
S St. Germarn v. Potlach Lbr. Co., note 68, supra.
" See cases cited in note 19, supra.
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had he lived. These latter are more properly called survival
statutes. Remington's Compiled Statutes section 194 is of this
latter type.
Prior to 1927 there was some doubt as to who was the proper
person to maintain the action. The 1927 amendment,74 however,
removed all doubts by providing that the action should be main-
tamed by the administrator of the deceased's estate. 75 This is the
only change effected by this amendment.
It should be noted that the beneficiaries named are not the same
as under section 183, the word "husband" being omitted from the
beneficiaries. At first blush since the statute constantly uses the
masculine pronoun it would seem that the action could only be
maintained where the deceased was a male person. Such, how-
ever, has not been the construction placed upon it by our court.
Following the liberal rule of construction adopted by our court in
interpreting this statute, the court has held that an action may
be maintained thereunder for the benefit of the children, for the
death of their mother.76 It is doubtful, however, if an action could
be maintained for the benefit of a husband since his name is entirely
omitted from the list of beneficiaries. If there are no wife and
children then the action is to be prosecuted in favor of the depen-
dent parents, minor brothers and sisters. The degree of dependency
required is the same as in an action on their behalf under sec-
tion 18477 It is not necessary that the deceased be a minor child 78
The sole measure of damages under this statute is the pain and
suffering of the deceased between the time of injury and the time
of death, and the medical expenses incurred by him prior to death.79
The loss sustained by the beneficiaries by reason of the death is im-
material. 0
Since the action under the survival statute is an entirely separate
and independent cause of action8' from that given by section 183, it
11 L. '27, p. 143, sec. 1.
'7 Since the enactment of the amendment the court has intimated that
the administrator was the proper person to maintain the action under the
statute, before the amendment. Whiting v. Seattle, 144 Wash. 668, 258
Pac. 824 (1927).
14 Thompson v. Seattle, Renton & S. R. Co., 71 Wash. 436, 128 Pac.
1070 (1912).
' Bortle v. Northern Pac. Ry. Go., note 50, supra.
Machek v. Seattle, note 48, supra.
10 Thompson v. Seattle, Renton & S. R. Co., note 76, supra. Machek v.
Seattle, note 48, supra.
"Seattle Electric Co. v. Hartless, 144 Fed. 379, (C. C. A. 9th, 1906).
Swanson v. Pacific Shzpptng Co., 60 Wash. 87, 110 Pac. 795 (1910)
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follows that one is not a bar to the other and both may be main-
tamed for the benefit of the named beneficiaries. 2 Further where
both causes of action are brought by the administrator they may
be joined m one suit."'
IV Tim DEFENSE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
1. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF THE DEcEAsED.
The general rule followed in practically all jurisdictions is that
the contributory negligence of the deceased will bar an action
either under a death statute"4 or under a survival statute."5 That
it should bar an action under the survival statute is obvious since
all that is given by such a statute is the right of action which the
deceased himself -would have had, had he lived. That it would bar
the action for wrongful death proper is not -quite so clear in the
light of the universally recognized principle that the death statutes
create an entirely new and independent cause of action. The reas-
onng generally advanced to sustain the view that the contributory
negligence of the deceased will bar a recovery even under the death
statutes is that while such statutes create a new cause of action,
this new cause of action is dependent upon the existence of a cause
of action in the deceased for Ins injuries had he lived. 6 The
Supreme Court of this state in a number of early cases held without
discussion that the deceased's contributory negligence would bar a
recovery 8 7 The question was first discussed in 1919, and the court
after a review of the authorities adhered to its earlier cases, assign-
mg the same reason for the rule as outlined above.88
2. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF THE BENEFicARIS.
Where the sole beneficiary of the action for wrongful death is
guilty of contributory negligence proximately contributing to the
"Machek v. Seattle, note 48, supra, Puget Sound T. L. & P CJo., v.
Frescoln, 245 Fed. 301 (C. C. A. 9th, 1917).
"Whiting v. Seattle, note 75, supra, overruling Howe v. Whitman
County, 120 Wash. 247, 206 Pac. 968 (1922) contra.
"Gay v. Winter, 34 Cal. 153 (1867).
15Brown -v. West River~sze Coal Co., 143 Iowa 662, 120 N. W 732, 28
L. I. A. (n. s.) 1260 (1909).
"See Tn7-NY, ibud, sections 66 and 124.
"Morgan v. Carbon Hill Coal Go., 6 Wash. 577, 34 Fac. 152 (1893)
Brennan v. Front St. Cable By. Co., 8 Wash. 363, 36 Pac. 272 (1894)
Hamlin -v. Columbza, P S. R. Co., 37 Wash. 449, 79 Pac. 991 (1905).
" Ostheller v. Spokane & Inland Empire Ry. Co., 107 Wash. 678, 182
Pac. 630 (1919), Heath v. Wylie, 109 Wash. 86, 186 Pac. 313 (1919) accord.
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injury, there can be no recovery 9 on the theory that to permit
such a recovery would violate the maxim that no man shall profit
by his own negligence.9 This is the general rule elsewhere.
A difficult question arises in cases where one of several joint
beneficiaries has been guilty of contributory negligence. In Wash-
ington the question has been further complicated by the community
property system. It is the settled law of this state that a recovery
for personal injuries to the person of either the husband or the
wife is community property 91 On similar reasoning a recovery
by the parent under section 184 has been held to be community
property 92 So it has been held that contributory negligence of the
father will bar an action for the death of a child by the mother, since
any recovery had by her would be community property, and to
permit a recovery under such circumstances would indirectly be
permitting the father to profit by his own wrong. Where the
joint beneficiaries are other than husband and wife it would seem
that the contributory negligence of one would not bar an action
on behalf of the others to the extent that they have been injured
by reason of the death, as to hold otherwise would in effect be to
impute the negligence of one beneficiary to all the others. No
cases on this point have as yet arisen in this state, but the prevail-
ing opinion elsewhere is in accord with this suggestion, although
there is a conflict of authority 9
4
3. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF THE H-USBAND AS AFFECTING THE
RIGHT OF ACTION FOR DEATH OF THE WIFE.
It is the rule in Washington that the contributory negli-
gence of the husband will bar an action by the children for the
death of the wife.9 This rule is an anomalous one and is based
upon our community property system. The theory of this holding
is, that the existence of a cause of action in the deceased, had he
lived, is a condition precedent to any right of action for the death
" Vinette v. Northern Pac. By Co., 47 Wash. 320, 91 Pac. 975, 18
L. R. A. (n. s.) 328 (1907) Crzvelli v. Chicago, M. & St. P R. Co., 98
Wash. 42, 167 Pac. 66, L. R. A. 1918A, 206 (1917).
0C1rvelli v. Chicago M. & St. P R. Co., note 89, supra.
*2Hawkins v. Front St. C. Ry. Go., 3 Wash. 592, 28 Pac. 1021, 28 Am. St.
Rep. 72, 16, L. R. A. 808 (1892).
2 'Crvelli v. Chicago, M. & St. P R. Co., note 89, supra.
"Crvelli v. Chwago M. & St. P R. Co., note 89, supra.
"TIFFANY, ibid, section 72.
O-5stheller v. Spokane & Inland Emptire R. Co., note 88, supra, Heath
r. Wylie, note 88, supra.
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on behalf of the beneficiares.9 6 It is then argued that the wife
has no cause of action for personal injuries where the husband was
guilty of contributory negligence since such recovery under the
rule of Hawkins v. Front St. Cable R. Co., 97 would be community
property and to permit a recovery by the wife would be to indi-
rectly allow the husband to profit by his own wrong. Therefore,
the argument concludes, since the wife had no cause of action for
the injuries had she lived, no action for the death may be main-
tamed on behalf of the children or other beneficiaries. This chain
of argument is not open to attack once the correctness of the deci-
sion in the Hawkins case to the effect that a recovery for personal
injuries to the wife is community property, is conceded. Any
analysis or criticism of the decision in that case lies outside the
scope of fins paper. Suffice it to say that the Hawk=iis case is now
so firmly established in the jurisprudence of this state that any
attempt to change the rule there announced must come from the
legislature. BRYANT BRADY.#
" See discussion under paragraph 1, above.
" Note 91, supra.
*Of the Seattle, Washington, Bar.
